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RECENT DECISIONS
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRoCEss--JumcIAL REvmw OF JURY DETERMINATION ON CoERCED CHARACTER OF CoNFBSSION-Petitioner, suspected of
the murder of his parents, was subjected to intensive police interrogation culminating in a confession to a state-employed psychiatrist. Petitioner had been
allowed only a small amount of sleep and was suffering from a sinus condition
when he was introduced to the psychiatrist, who was represented as a general
practitioner. The questioning of the psychiatrist, who was skilled in hypnosis,
was a subtle blend of threats and promises of leniency. Within the next three
and one-half hours petitioner also confessed to a police captain, a business associate, and two assistant state prosecutors. The confession to the psychiatrist was
held1 to have been coerced and its admission in evidence violative of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,2 but the nn:ding of the jury in a
second trial that the confessions subsequently given were voluntary was upheld
and the conviction was affirmed.8 In a habeas corpus proceeding, petitioner
charged that the confessions used against him were coerced. On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court held, petition granted and conviction reversed,
Justices Minton, Reed, and Burton dissenting and Justice Jackson not participating. The confessions used against petitioner were parts of one continuous
process of protracted interrogation and psychological pressure on him, and their
admission as evidence was violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 74 S.Ct. 716 (1954).
In 1936 the United States Supreme Court :lirst employed the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to reverse a state court conviction in which
a coerced confession was used against the defendant. 4 Succeeding cases have
indicated that mental as well as physical coercion will justify overturning a
conviction based wholly or partly upon a confession resulting from such coercion.5 The traditional basis for exclusion of involuntary confessions is that they
are lacking in probative value and are untrustworthy,6 but the view accepted by
the majority of the Supreme Court until 1953 was that coerced confessions are
Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E. (2d) 553 (1951).
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law••••" U.S. CoNST., amend. XIV, §1.
a People v. Leyra, 304 N.Y. 468, 108 N.E. (2d) 673 (1952).
4Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936).
5 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472 (1940). Other cases involving
claims of coerced confessions are Llsenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S.
596, 64 S.Ct. 1208 (1944), a case similar to the principal case but with a contrary result;
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945), in which the Supreme Court
held that the conviction must be reversed regardless of the existence of other evidence sufficient to convict. For a thorough review of cases up to 1948, see Bader, "Coerced Confessions and the Due Process Clause,'' 15 BROOKLYN L. REv. 51 (1949). Representative of
the same philosophy since 1948 are Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949),
and Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 72 S.Ct. 599 (1952).
6 3 WrcMoRE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §822 (1940).
1 People v.
2 " ••• nor
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excluded to prevent "fundamental unfairness" 7 in the conduct of a criminal trial.
In Stein v. New York, 8 decided in 1953, the majority of the Supreme Court, in
an opinion written by Justice Jackson, made a number of rulings which have
led to much comment.9 The Supreme Court upheld the New York practice
of submitting the issue of voluntariness of confessions to the jury,10 even though
the general verdict of guilt in the Stein case did not indicate whether the jury
found the confession to be coerced. The Court said that as long as there was
other evidence upon which the verdict could be based, the conviction would be
upheld even though the jury may have found the confession to be coerced.11
The majority thus seemed to be saying that as long as the defendant is not
prejudiced he has not been deprived of due process of law. In addition, the
majority opinion in the Stein case indicated that the proper basis for exclusion
of coerced confessions is the "untrustworthy and lacking in probative value"
test, and not the "fundamental unfairness" test.12 Since in the principal case
petitioner's conviction rested solely on the allegedly coerced confessions,18 the
principal case cannot be said to be a specific reversal of Stein v. New York,
in which the Supreme Court found evidence other than the confession to support
the conviction. However, certain aspects of the principal case may indicate
that the Court has reverted to the approach utilized prior to the Stein case.
Justice Black who dissented in Stein v. New York wrote the majority opinion
in the principal case, and Justice Minton's dissent in the principal case contains
language reminiscent of Justice Jackson's majority opinion in the Stein case.
The dissent would affirm the conviction because the issue of whether the confessions were voluntary was submitted to the jury, a factor stressed also by Justice
Jackson in the· Stein case. The dissent also attempts to show that there was
other evidence such as the testimony of the assistant district attorneys that
petitioner was calm and relaxed when he made the last confession to them. 14
Finally, the majority opinion seems to assume that it is for the Supreme Court
to make an independent determination of the issue of coercion, a view which
was espoused in the decisions prior to the Stein case, whereas the majority
opinion in the Stein case indicated tendency to accept the determination of the
state court on the coercion issue, as did the dissent in the principal case. For
7 Justice

Roberts in Lisenba v. California, note 5 supra.

s 346 U.S. 156, 73 S.Ct. 1077 (1953).
9 See, e.g., Garfinkel, ''The Fourteenth Amendment and State Criminal Proceedings'Ordered Liberty' or 'Just Deserts,'" 41 CALIF. L. REv. 672 (1953); 39 CoRN. L.Q. 321
(1954); 52 MICH. L. REv. 421 (1954).
10 See 170 A.L.R. 567 (1947) for a collection of cases in point.
11 See Malinski v. New York, note 5 supra, for the earlier position of the Supreme
Court.
12 To the same effect, see Justice Jackson's dissent in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, note 5
supra. See also Inbau, ''The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court," 43
Ju. L. REv. 442 (1948).
18 The trial court charged the jury that all other evidence was as a matter of law
insufficient to support a verdict of guilty.
14 In light of note 13 supra, this finding by the dissenters does not appear to have
much support.
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the above reasons the principal case may be construed as an unspoken overruling of Stein 11. New York.

James M. Potter, S.Ed.

